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INTRODUCTION

During the Survey year,' the Illinois Supreme Court's decisions
in the area of family law focused on the interpretation and application of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
("IMDMA"). 2 The supreme court resolved a conflict between the
appellate courts on the issue of extrajudicial modification of child
support.3 The court also addressed the issues of service of summons on a minor, 4 removal of a child to another state, 5 the stan6
dards of proof required in an action to terminate parental rights,
anticipatory repudiation of pension settlements, 7 prospective attor* Associate, John B. Hirsch, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., 1980, DePaul University; M.A.,
1982, DePaul University; J.D., 1985, Loyola University of Chicago.
** B.A., 1987, University of Chicago; J.D. candidate, 1990, Loyola University of
Chicago.
1. The Survey year encompasses July 1, 1987, through July 1, 1988. This year's Survey focuses on supreme court decisions and limits the treatment of appellate court decisions to two cases that signify especially important developments in the field of family
law.
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 101-802 (1987).
3. See infra notes 14-38 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 69-84 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 100-13 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.

462

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

ney's fees, 8 grandparental visitation, 9 and choice of forum in an
interspousal tort action.10 Additionally, the court interpreted and
applied the anti-supersession clause of the Michigan Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act ("URESA") to resolve an
issue of modification of child support."' During the Survey year,
Illinois appellate courts made important decisions regarding the
12
freedom to contract in the context of an antenuptial agreement
and regarding the IMDMA on the issue of the standing of a child
to enforce a child support decree.'"
II.

A.

CHILD SUPPORT

Modification of Child Support

In Blisset v. Blisset,14 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the
issue of modification of child support by an extrajudicial agreement
between the parents.' 5 The supreme court held that courts generally are not bound by such extrajudicial agreements. 16 The court
further held that reliance on extrajudicial agreements does not rise
to the level of reasonableness or detriment necessary to sustain a
plea of equitable estoppel 7 or laches.' s To enforce such agree8. See infra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 130-42 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
14. 123 Ill. 2d 161, 526 N.E.2d 125 (1988). See Blisset v. Blisset, 144 I11.App. 3d
1088, 495 N.E.2d 608 (4th Dist. 1986), and Pekala & Katz, Family Law, 19 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 489, 494-96 (1988), for discussion of Blisset at the appellate court level.
15. Blisset, 123 I11.2d at 167, 526 N.E.2d at 127.
16. Id. The court cited ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 502(b) (1987). Section 502(b)
provides:
The terms of the separation agreement, except those providing for the support,
custody and visitation of children, are binding upon the court unless it finds,
after considering the economic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties on their own motion or on request of the
court, that the separation agreement is unconscionable.
Id.
17. Blisset, 123 Il. 2d at 169, 526 N.E.2d at 128. Equitable estoppel is "[t]he doctrine
by which a person may be precluded by his act or conduct, or silence when it is his duty
to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 280 (5th ed. 1979).
18. Blisset, 123 Ill. 2d at 170, 526 N.E.2d at 129. Laches is defined as:
[N]eglect to assert right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and
other circumstances causing prejudice to adverse party, operates as bar in court
of equity. The neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time
under circumstances permitting to do what in law should have been done.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

787 (5th ed. 1979).
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ments, the court noted, "would circumvent and undermine a
court's role in the establishment and modification of a child support obligation." 9
Allen and Barbara Blisset were divorced in 1975.20

Marital

property was apportioned and Barbara was awarded custody of the
two children, subject to "reasonable" visitation by Allen.2" In
March 1976, Allen successfully petitioned the court to define a specific visitation schedule.22 Subsequently, in June 1977, Allen
agreed to relinquish his visitation rights in consideration of Barbara's agreement to waive delinquent and prospective child support.2 3 For the next five years, Allen did not pay child support and
did not visit his children. Allen and Barbara did not communicate
with each other until September 1982, when Allen began visiting
his children, apparently with Barbara's permission.24 In March
1984, Barbara filed a petition for delinquent child support and an
increase in the amount to be paid in the future.25
Barbara contended that Allen had not paid the whole amount of
the child support that had accrued prior to June 1977, and that he
had not paid any support since that time.26 She further argued that
Allen's income had significantly increased and that his child support obligations should be consonantly modified.27
Allen argued that he had paid $2,080 of the child support that
had accrued prior to June 1977.28 Further, he asserted that Barbara should be equitably estopped from collecting arrearages, despite the lack of an enforceable agreement. 29 He also contended
that the doctrine of laches barred Barbara from seeking relief.30
The court noted that neither the language of the IMDMA nor
the traditional judicial function of protecting the children's interests provides binding force to extrajudicial modifications of child
19. Blisset, 123 Ill.
2d at 170, 526 N.E.2d at 129.
20. Id. at 164, 526 N.E.2d at 126.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 165, 526 N.E.2d at 126.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 166, 526 N.E.2d at 127.
25. Id. at 165, 526 N.E.2d at 126.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 168, 526 N.E.2d at 128. Allen argued that the court had recognized the
doctrine of equitable estoppel in the past and that his reliance on the agreement fulfilled
the criteria for equitable estoppel. Id.
30. Id. at 170, 526 N.E.2d at 129. Allen argued that the doctrine of laches applied
because his wife had not instituted suit for relief in the seven years that payments were
not made. Id.
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support.3 1 The parents' self-interest renders them unable to act objectively and in the child's best interest. 32 Extrajudicial agreements, therefore, would circumvent the judicial protection of a
child's best interest.33
The court further found that Allen was on notice that he could
not bargain away his visitation rights, and therefore his reliance on
his agreement to give up those rights was unreasonable. 34 The
court stated that if it allowed the forfeiture of visitation or the failure to anticipate enforcement of support payments to constitute a
detriment that would be sufficient to support an equitable remedy,
then the court's attempt to respect the best interests of the child
would be frustrated. 35 Therefore, Barbara was not barred from
bringing suit to collect child support arrearages. 36 The case was
remanded to the circuit court for the calculation of arrearages.37
In Blisset, the supreme court resolved a split of opinion between
the appellate districts on the issue of the enforceability of extrajudicial agreements to modify child support. Prior to Blisset, the Third
District had left open the possibility of equitable remedies.38 In
Blisset, however, the court reserved to itself the role of arbiter of
the child's best interest.
In In re Marriage of Gifford,39 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the issue of the modification of an Illinois child support
order by another state. The court was required to interpret and
apply the anti-supersession clause of the Uniform Reciprocal En31. Id. at 167, 526 N.E.2d at 127-28.
32. Id. at 167, 526 N.E.2d at 128. The court stated that "[p]arents may not bargain
away their children's interests" because they might try to turn their children's rights to
their own benefit. Id. Therefore, parents must establish to the satisfaction of the court
that any agreements affecting a child's rights are consistent with the best interests of the
child. Id. at 168, 526 N.E.2d at 128.
33. Id. at 167, 526 N.E.2d at 128.
34. Id. at 169, 526 N.E. 2d at 128-29. Allen's equitable estoppel and laches arguments failed because during the 1984 proceedings, he had been advised by the State's
Attorney that he could not give up his visitation rights. Id. Thus, his reliance on an
agreement resting on the forfeiture of his visitation rights was unreasonable and could not
fulfill the doctrinal requirements for reasonable detrimental reliance. Id. The court cited
Finley v. Finley, 81 111. 2d 317, 410 N.E.2d 12 (1980), in reference to the issue of laches.
In Finley, the court stated that "a spouse is not injured because he is forced to pay the
accumulated support in one lump sum as opposed to weekly payments as ordered." Id.
at 330, 410 N.E.2d at 23.
35. Blisset, 123 Ill. 2d at 169-70, 526 N.E.2d at 128-29. The court reasoned that such
liberalities would allow parents "to look past 6ae best interests of the child." Id.
36. Id. at 170, 526 N.E.2d at 129.
37. Id. at 173, 526 N.E.2d at 130.
38. See Bartlett v. Bartlett, 70 Ill. App. 3d 661, 389 N.E.2d 15 (3d Dist. 1979).
39. 122 Ill. 2d 34, 521 N.E.2d 929 (1988).
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forcement of Support Act ("URESA").'4 The court held that the
Michigan order of support did not modify the Illinois divorce decree.4" Rather, under URESA, it provided an additional and separate means to enforce child support obligations.42 Therefore, full
faith and credit could be given to Michigan law by entitling the
obligor to a credit on the original support order for the amounts
paid under the additional order.43
Janice and Robert Gifford were married in Michigan in 1973,
divorced in Illinois in 1982." Subsequently, Robert moved to
Michigan and stopped making child support payments.45 In July
1982, Janice filed a URESA petition in Cook County, Illinois, to
compel payment of child support.46 Ultimately, the petition was
forwarded to the Circuit Court of Berrien County, Michigan,
which found that Robert could not meet his duty of child support
and prospectively lowered his obligations.
Janice argued that the Michigan support order modified the
Illinois order in violation of the plain language of the antisupersession clause. 48 Robert, on the other hand, argued that the
clause only prohibited an order that modified vested arrearagesand
not one that prospectively modified support.49 Janice responded
that there was nothing in the language of the clause that limited its
application to vested arrearages and, therefore, the clause should
apply to prospective orders as well."°
The court agreed that there was nothing in the plain language of
the clause that limits its application to vested arrearages. 5 ' Moreover, the court held that the Michigan order did not constitute a
40. URESA is a model code that has been enacted in one form or another in most
states. Its purpose is to provide out-of-state enforcement of support orders. The Michigan anti-supersession clause applied by the court states:
Any order of support issued by a court of this state when acting as a responding
state shall not supersede any previous order of support issued in a divorce or
separate maintenance action, but the amounts for a particular period paid pursuant to either order shall be credited against amounts accruing or accrued for
the same period under both.
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 780.171 (West 1982).
41. Gifford, 122 Ill. 2d at 39, 521 N.E.2d at 931.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 35, 521 N.E.2d at 929.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 36, 521 N.E.2d at 930.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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modification of the original order, but rather provided an additional means for its enforcement. 52 Therefore, Robert was obligated to pay arrearages and any future amounts accruing under the
Illinois order.53 He was, however, entitled to be credited for any
amount paid under the Michigan order.54
The Gifford case reaffirmed a fundamental principle of full faith
and credit: an obligor cannot escape his or her obligations by simply moving to another state. The Gifford decision, however, is perhaps not so much an indication that the court is committed to the
reaffirmation of basic principles, as it is a sign that the court's time
is wasted in responding to hornbook-style questions of law.
B.

Standing of a Child to Enforce Support

In Miller v. Miller,5 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District adopted a contract formula to determine whether or not a
child has standing as a third party beneficiary to enforce a child
support agreement.5 6 The court held that circumstances may exist
in which a child's interests need to be protected from the conflicting interests of the parents.5 7
52. Id. at 38-39, 521 N.E.2d at 931. The court relied on the language of the Michigan
URESA statute, which states: "remedies herein provided are in addition and not in substitution for any other remedies". MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.154 (West 1982) (emphasis added). The court also noted that its decision was in accord with every
jurisdiction that had considered this issue. See Westberry v. Reynolds, 134 Ariz. 29, 653
P.2d 379 (1982); In re Marriage of Popenhager, 99 Cal. App. 3d 514, 160 Cal. Rptr. 379
(1979); Ray v. Ray, 247 Ga. 467, 277 S.E.2d 495 (1981); Despain v. Despain, 78 Idaho
185, 300 P.2d 500 (1956); D.L.M. v. V.E.M., 438 N.E.2d 1023 (Ind. App. 1982); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 476 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. App. 1972); Howard v. Howard, 191 So. 2d 528
(Miss. 1966); Campbell v. Jenne, 172 Mont. 219, 563 P.2d 574 (1977); Peot v. Peot, 92
Nev. 388, 551 P.2d 242 (1976); Lanum v. Lanum, 92 A.D.2d 912, 460 N.Y.S.2d 344
(1983); Thompson v. Thompson 366 N.W.2d 845 (S.D. 1985); Nissen v. Miller, 642
S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. App. 1982); Oglesby v. Oglesby, 29 Utah 2d 419, 510 P.2d 1106
(1973); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 27 Wash. App. 391, 618 P.2d 528 (1980).
53. Gifford, 122 Ill. 2d at 38-39, 521 N.E.2d at 931.
54. Id. at 40, 521 N.E.2d at 931. Because the Michigan order only provides an additional means of enforcement of the Illinois order, the court reasoned that amounts paid
under the Michigan order are properly identified as amounts due under the Illinois order.
Id.
55. 163 Ill. App. 3d 602, 516 N.E.2d 837 (1st Dist. 1987).
56. Id. at 616, 516 N.E.2d at 847.
57. Id. at 606, 516 N.E.2d at 840. The court relied on a provision of the IMDMA
which states that:
The court may appoint an attorney to represent the interests of a minor or
dependent child with respect to his support, custody and visitation. The court
shall enter an order for costs, fees and disbursements in favor of the child's
attorney. The order shall be made against either or both parents, or against the
child's separate estate.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 506 (1987).
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As part of their divorce agreement, Martha and Glenn Miller
entered into a property settlement that included a promise by
Glenn that he would pay for his son's college expenses.58 Approximately ten years later, just before the child's eighteenth birthday,
the parents entered into a second agreement wherein Martha
waived all future claims for alimony and child support in consideration for $11,500 paid to her by Glenn. 9 Additionally, she agreed
not to seek enforcement of the original settlement on her son's behalf." Nevertheless, the child sued his father for enforcement of
the original agreement in 1984, after incurring close to $20,000 in
costs for college tuition, books, and supplies.6 The father sought
to block the suit by arguing that his son had no standing to sue on
the original settlement because he was not a party to the
proceedings.62
The court adopted a three-part contract test to determine the
son's standing to sue as a third-party beneficiary. 63 First, the court
found that the original agreement embodied a clear intent by the
parents to benefit their son.64 Second, payment of college tuition
and expenses benefitted their son directly. 65 Third, the son clearly
relied on the agreement when he matriculated.66 Accordingly, the
son was a third-party beneficiary to the original divorce agreement
and had standing to sue under the original order.67
Despite the supposed clarity and utility of the test used in Miller,
the Miller decision was heavily fact-based. The holding was
shaped as much by the equities of the case as by logic. The Miller
decision is significant for recognizing that third-party beneficiary
58. Miller, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 603, 516 N.E.2d at 838. The 1968 agreement provided
in part that "Glenn E. Miller shall pay for the expenses including the college tuition
incident to the attendance in college by the child of the parties, Ward Anthony [Miller],
even though he may have attained the age of majority .... Id.
59. Id. at 603-04, 516 N.E.2d at 839.
60. Id. The 1979 agreement stated that: "Wife agrees that after WARD MILLER
reaches the age of majority on May 25, 1979, she will not seek to enforce, on his behalf,
any of his rights under the court order of January 17, 1968, and the oral Property Settlement Agreement between the parties." Id. at 604, 516 N.E.2d at 839.
61. Id.at 611, 516 N.E.2d at 844.
62. Id. at 609, 516 N.E.2d at 842.
63. Id. at 612, 516 N.E.2d at 844.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.at 613, 516 N.E.2d at 845.
67. Id. at 617, 516 N.E.2d at 847. See also Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Parrett 346
Ill. 252, 257-58, 178 N.E. 498, 501 (1931) ("[tlhe rule is settled in this state that, if a
contract be entered into for a direct benefit of a third person not a party thereto, such
third person may sue for breach thereof").
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rules can apply between parents and children in the context of
divorce.
III.
A.

CHILD CUSTODY

68

Removal of a Child to Another State

In In re Marriageof Eckert,69 the supreme court reaffirmed the
long-standing principle that the benefit to the child is the most important consideration in determining whether to allow the custodial parent to remove a child to another state.70 The parent
seeking to remove the child has the burden of proving that the
removal would be in the child's best interest.71
Carol and Mark Eckert were divorced on December 18, 1983.72
Custody of their minor son, Matthew, was awarded to Carol, with
certain visitation rights reserved for Mark.73 In May 1985, Carol
filed for permission to remove Matthew to Arizona. 74 After her
successful appeal of the trial court's denial of her petition, the
supreme court granted her husband leave to appeal.75
Carol set forth various arguments to show that the move was in
the best interests of her children. First, she argued that she had
been offered a teaching position in Arizona.76 Moreover, Arizona's
climate would be beneficial to her son from a previous marriage
because the child was asthmatic.77
Her husband responded that neither circumstance directly or
necessarily benefitted their son Matthew.7 8 He argued that, in fact,
the move would injure the parent/child relationship between his
son and himself; therefore, the move would be detrimental to the
child's best interest.79
The supreme court held that section 609 of the IMDMA re68. Section 602(a) of IMDMA provides the unifying principle behind all child
custody cases: "The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of
the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
para. 602(a) (1987).
69. 119 Ill. 2d 316, 518 N.E.2d 1041 (1988).
70. Id. at 325, 518 N.E.2d at 1044.
71. Id. at 330, 518 N.E.2d at 1047.
72. Id. at 319, 518 N.E.2d at 1042.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 320, 518 N.E.2d at 1042.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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quires a strict standard of proof of benefit to the child.8 0 The court
criticized the appellate court for applying a standard that merely
required "a sensible reason" for the removal.8 " The court went on
to state that the move, in itself, would be neutral with respect to
the child.8 2 Nonetheless, contact with the father, with whom he
enjoyed an exceptionally good relationship, and the extended family, were definitely positive benefits to the child.8 3 Consequently,
the court denied the petition for removal.8 4
Thus, in Eckert, the Illinois Supreme Court corrected the movement, apparent in some appellate court decisions, toward liberal
allowances of removal petitions that are a serious detriment to the
other parent's relationship with the child.
B.

Termination of ParentalRights

In In re Pronger8 5 the supreme court held that section 4-3 of the
Juvenile Court Act8 6 did not require personal service of summons
80. Id. at 324, 518 N.E.2d at 1044. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 609 (1987).
Section 609, which was revised, effective January 1, 1988, provides as follows:
(a) The court may grant leave, before or after judgment, to any party having
custody of any minor child or children to remove such child or children from
Illinois whenever such approval is in the best interests of such child or children.
The burden of proving that such removal is in the best interests of such child or
children is on the party seeking the removal. When such removal is permitted,
the court may require the party removing such child or children from Illinois to
give reasonable security guaranteeing the return of such children.
(b) Before a minor child is temporarily removed from Illinois, the parent responsible for the removal shall inform the other parent, or the other parent's
attorney, of the address and telephone number where the child may be reached
during the period of temporary removal, and the date on which the child shall
return to Illinois.
The State of Illinois retains jurisdiction when the minor child is absent from
the State pursuant to this subsection.
Id.
81. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326, 518 N.E.2d at 1045.
82. Id. at 323, 518 N.E.2d at 1043. The trial court relied on the fact that the mother
may have desired the relocation only as a way of interfering with visitation and enhancing
her relationship with a doctor that she had been dating. Id. The court noted that no
evidence was introduced to show how the move would benefit the asthmatic son. Id.
83. Id. The court recognized that despite his varying work schedule, the father had
never missed a visitation with his son. Id. Several witnesses testified that he was caring,
conscientious, and loving. Id. Further, a court-appointed psychiatrist testified that the
relationship between the father and son contributed to the son's continued well-being and
adjustment. Id.
84. Id. at 331, 518 N.E.2d at 1047.
85. 118 Ill. 2d 512, 517 N.E.2d 1076 (1987).
86. Specifically, the statute provided:
(1) When a petition is filed, the clerk of the court shall issue a summons with a
copy of the petition attached. The summons shall be directed to the minor and
to each person named as a respondent in the petition. If in the petition the

470
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upon minors in cases of juvenile neglect
when the substantive
7
rights of the child are not endangered.1
Between 1983 and 1985, fifteen custody hearings were held to
question the fitness of Elizabeth Green (also known as Michelle
Pronger) to act as custodial parent of her son, Gabriel Pronger. as
The summons was not served on the child until the termination
proceedings that led to this appeal.8 9
Green argued that section 4-3 of the Juvenile Court Act required
personal summons on her son and that a failure to provide such
service deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights. 9° The appellate court vacated the termination order9
and the State appealed. 92
The supreme court reversed the appellate court. 93 The court
noted that the language of section 4-3 had been amended since the
proceedings in which the child was not personally served.94 In
fact, section 4-3 no longer required personal service on the child. 95
The court stated that the legislature intended the statute to apply
retroactively. 96 Further, the amendment affected only procedural
97
rights that the court found were typically applied retroactively.
name of any respondent is alleged to be unknown, he shall be designated as
respondent under the style of 'All whom it may Concern'.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-3 (1979). This section was amended by the New Juvenile Court Act of 1987, which provides that "[w]hen a petition is filed, the clerk of the
court shall issue a summons with a copy of the petition attached. The summons shall be
directed to the minor's legal guardian or custodian and to each person named as a respondent in the petition." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-15 (1987).
87. Pronger, 118 Ill. 2d at 525, 517 N.E.2d at 1081.
88. Id. at 518, 517 N.E.2d at 1078.
89. Id.
90. Id. Green relied on two appellate court cases in which the failure to give notice
to minors as known respondents in juvenile proceedings deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. See In re Crouch, 131 Ill. App. 3d 694, 476 N.E.2d 69 (4th Dist. 1985); In re
Day, 138 Ill. App. 3d 783, 486 N.E.2d 307 (4th Dist. 1985).
91. Pronger, 118 Ill. 2d at 515, 517 N.E.2d at 1076.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 527, 517 N.E.2d at 1082.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The court concluded that the legislature amended section 4-3 as a response to
the decision in In re Day, 138 Ill. App. 3d 783, 486 N.E.2d 307 (4th Dist. 1985). In Day,
the court held that the failure to give personal notice to a child deprived the trial court of
jurisdiction over the child. Id. at 786, 486 N.E.2d at 309. Because "[tihe legislature
clearly felt that the Day court had misinterpreted Section 4-3[,] ... it sought to correct
the error so that its goal of protecting children would not be defeated." Pronger, 118 Ill.
2d at 521, 517 N.E.2d at 1079.
97. Pronger, 118 I11.2d at 522, 517 N.E.2d at 1080. The court cited Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 114 N.E.2d 686 (1953), in which service of process on a defendant
who could not be located was allowed by retroactively applying section 20a of the Motor
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Even if the court ruled that the trial court did not have jurisdiction, hearings would be reinstituted under the amendment and service would be made in the same manner as in the previous
proceedings. 98 Therefore, the court held that the amendment to
section 4-3 applied to the case at bar and that the trial court's order
could not be vacated for lack of jurisdiction.99
In In re Enis,'° the supreme court held that termination of parental rights is governed by section 704-6(1) of the Juvenile Court
Act, which requires that allegations be proven by "clear and convincing" evidence.'' The Adoption Act standard applied by the
trial court, which required proof by a "preponderance of the evidence," was, therefore, inconsistent with the principles of due
process. O
The Enis' child, Sabrina, was made a ward of the court after a
series of proceedings in the spring of 1982.103 In December of the
same year, Sabrina was returned to her parents. IoI By March 1983,
however, the State petitioned to terminate the Enis' parental rights,
alleging that the child had suffered continual physical abuse."5
The parents argued that due process requires proof of unfitness
by "clear and convincing evidence" and not a "preponderance of
Vehicle Act, which provided for substitute service on the Secretary of State. The court
stated that "the manner of service of process is merely a step in obtaining jurisdiction of a
person after he has been made a party to a suit. It is therefore a matter of practice or
procedure and not a matter of substantive law." Pronger, 118 Ill. 2d at 522, 517 N.E.2d
at 1080.
98. Pronger, 118 Ill. 2d at 522, 517 N.E.2d at 1080.
99. Id. at 525, 517 N.E.2d at 1081. The court also reviewed the trial court's conclusion that Elizabeth Green was an unfit parent under section 1 of the Adoption Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1501 (1987). It found that "overwhelming evidence of respondent's bizarre and delusional beliefs and behavior" existed in the record to make apparent
that the trial court's finding was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Pronger,
118 Ill. 2d at 526, 517 N.E.2d at 1080.
100. 121 Ill. 2d 124, 520 N.E.2d 362 (1988).
101. Id. at 133, 520 N.E.2d at 367.
102. Id. The Adoption Act states in pertinent part:
D. 'Unfit person' means any person whom the court shall find to be unfit to
have a child sought to be adopted, the grounds of such unfitness being any one
of the following:
(f) Two or more findings of physical abuse to any children under Section 4-8
of the Juvenile Court Act, or a criminal conviction resulting from the death of
any child by physical child abuse; or a finding of physical child abuse resulting
from the death of any child under Section 4-8 of the Juvenile Court Act; ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1501(D)(f) (1987).
103. Enis, 121 Ill. 2d at 126, 520 N.E.2d at 363.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 127, 520 N.E.2d at 364.
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the evidence."'' 0 6 A termination order could not be based on prior
findings of abuse that applied a "preponderance of evidence" standard. 0 7 Therefore, they argued, the appellate court erred in not
vacating the trial court's termination order. 0 8 The State asserted
that the pertinent sections of the Adoption Act were intended to
base termination on a clear and convincing pattern of improper
conduct by the parent.109
The court rejected the State's argument, pointing out that the
trial court had relied on a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. 10 Further, the court noted that nothing in the Act requires
courts to review such prior determinations to make sure that allegations could be proven by "clear and convincing evidence.""'
Because the Adoption Act authorized termination of parental
rights based on an improper standard of proof, it did not afford due
process. 112 Therefore, the appellate court erred in failing
to strike
13
allegations predicated on the prior fitness hearings.'
IV.

PROPERTY AND MAINTENANCE

The supreme court in In re Marriage of Olsen I" held that cash
disbursements of pension plans that have been apportioned between the parties to a divorce settlement must be paid to both parties at the time of disbursement."I 5
In an amicable settlement, the benefits of the husband's pension
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 132, 520 N.E.2d at 366. The State contended that such a "pattern" could
be shown by a finding that the child had been abused on two previous occasions as defined by the Juvenile Court Act. Id. These two occasions can establish "clear and convincing" evidence of abuse and the unfitness of the parent. Id.
110. Id. at 134, 520 N.E.2d at 367. The supreme court quoted from the trial court's
decision in which the trial court stated that a preponderance of evidence established the
Enis' intractability and unfitness. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. The court relied on Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), in which the
United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a New York statute that
permitted the termination of parental rights by a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Id. In holding that the statute was unconstitutional, the Court noted that standards of
proof allocate risks of error; therefore, where fundamental rights such as parental rights
are at stake, higher standards of proof are necessary to guarantee that such rights are not
infringed. Id. at 746. The Court stated that "before a State may sever completely and
irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State
support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence." Id. at 747-48.
113. Enis, 121 Ill. 2d at 134, 520 N.E.2d at 367.
114. 124 Ill. 2d 19, 528 N.E.2d 684 (1988).
115. Id. at 28, 528 N.E.2d at 688.
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stock plan were divided equally between the parties; the intention
being to provide for the parties' old age." 6 The plan contemplated
payment upon the husband's retirement and expressly provided for
defeasance of the wife's interest upon her remarriage, but it was
silent regarding her death.III After the stock shares in the pension
fund split, the husband redeemed the shares and received a cash
disbursement."' The husband did not transfer any portion of the
cash to his wife."1 9 It was not until after her death that her estate
discovered that the husband had redeemed the shares. Thus, the
estate brought suit to compel distribution of the wife's share of the
pension. 121

The wife's estate claimed that some portion of the pension was
to be shared with her estate as marital assets. 12

The payment, it

argued, should have been made when the husband redeemed his
shares. 22 The husband responded that the early realization of cash
was not contemplated under the settlement
and, therefore, that he
23
was not in breach of the agreement.

The court stated that the husband's failure to relinquish one-half
of the proceeds of the pension fund upon early realization did not
constitute anticipatory repudiation of the settlement because the
settlement agreement provided that payment would be made upon
his retirement. 24 It found that the husband intended to perform
the contract based on his understanding that the payment was due
125
upon his retirement.

116. Id. at 26-27, 528 N.E.2d at 687-88.
117. Id. at 23, 528 N.E.2d at 686.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 21, 528 N.E.2d at 685.
121. Id.
122. Id. The complaint alleged that the husband breached the settlement agreement
"by converting all of his then existing shares in the pension stock plan to cash, withdrawing the proceeds of said conversion, and failing and refusing to deliver any portion thereof
to Plaintiff." Id.
123. Id. at 21-22, 528 N.E.2d at 685. The court noted that the settlement agreement
provided that:
[Alt the time defendant retires he shall deliver to the plaintiff one-half of the
559.39 to be her sole property provided in the event plaintiff remarries prior to
the retirement of respondent she waives all claims as to her one-half share of the
559.39 shares of stock.
Id. at 22, 528 N.E.2d at 686 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 24, 528 N.E.2d at 686. The court noted that the doctrine of anticipatory
repudiation requires a clear manifestation of an intention not to perform that will completely defeat the purpose of the contract. Id. Because the husband stated his intention
to perform at the time of his retirement, and no evidence was put forward to the contrary,
no clear intent to defeat the settlement could be found. Id.
125. Id. at 25, 528 N.E.2d at 687.
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Consequently, the court held that the language of the settlement
as a whole and the intent of the parties should be examined to
determine the apportionment of the funds.126 The court found that
the intent of the parties was to divide the realization of the pension
stock for the financial security of both parties. 127 Therefore, upon
the early realization, the pension should have been divided. 128 The
occurrence of the stock split meant that the wife was still entitled
to one-half of the value of the stocks accumulated
during the mar1 29
disbursement.
of
date
the
of
as
valued
riage,
From a practical perspective, the Olsen decision demonstrates
the wisdom of circumspection and careful drafting, and the value
of an agreement that comprehends every reasonable circumstance
that is liable to arise. The court's decision, after all, was logical. It
probably represented what the parties would have wanted if they
had considered the possibility at the time of their divorce; yet, it
cost an expensive trip to the supreme court.
In Warren v. Warren, 130 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fifth District addressed the issues of the validity and enforceability
of an antenuptial agreement in which both parties waived all rights
to each other's property, maintenance, and attorney's fees in the
event of a dissolution of their marriage.' 3 1 Marvin and Marcia
Warren had lived together for more than three years prior to the
execution of their antenuptial agreement. 31 2 The agreement, which
Marcia signed without seeking the advice of independent counsel,
set forth the approximate net worth of each party. 133 Although the
agreement described Marvin's assets in general terms, it failed 1to
34
list his interest in certain oil properties and drilling equipment.

126. Id. The court asserted that "a court may properly disregard even unambiguous
language when it is clear that the parties meant something different from what was said."
Id. at 26, 528 N.E.2d at 687 (quoting United Airlines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 116 Ill. 2d
311, 318-19, 507 N.E.2d 858, 861 (1987)). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 comment c (1981); A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 710, at 492-93
(1982).
127. Olsen, 124 Ill. 2d at 27, 528 N.E.2d at 688.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 27-28, 528 N.E.2d at 688.
130. 169 Ill. App. 3d 226, 523 N.E.2d 680 (5th Dist. 1988).
131. In Illinois, these issues were first addressed in Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App. 3d 83,
320 N.E.2d 506 (1st Dist. 1974), and In re Marriage of Burgess, 123 Ill. App. 3d 487, 462
N.E.2d 203 (3d Dist. 1984). The issue of exchanging such a waiver for a fixed monetary
payment was first addressed in Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1st
Dist. 1972).
132. Warren, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 228, 523 N.E.2d at 681.
133. Marvin's approximate net worth was $7,000,000 and Marcia's approximate net
worth was $70,000. Id.
134. Id. at 230, 523 N.E.2d at 681-82.
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During the parties' cohabitation and marriage, Marvin supported
Marcia's children from her previous marriage, paid off her mortgage, paid for her eldest son's college education, bought vehicles
for Marcia and her son, and purchased a $350,000 house in his
name.1 35 Prior to their marriage, Marcia quit her job, at Marvin's
insistence, and 36she remained unemployed throughout their fiveyear marriage. 1
The appellate court agreed with the trial court's findings that
Marcia entered into the agreement with full knowledge because she
had ample opportunity to obtain legal advice, the agreement was
explained to her by Marvin's attorney before she signed it, and she
had sufficient personal experience in the business world to understand the significance of what she was doing.' 37 There was no
fraud, duress, or coercion involved in the execution of the agreement. 138 The appellate court also stated that the trial court reasonably could have found that Marcia's voluntary unemployment at
the time of the marriage could make her lack of future employability foreseeable. 1 39 Although her net worth had been reduced to approximately $32,000 at the time of the dissolution, her
assets were sufficient to keep her "from sinking into an imminent
condition of penury."'"
The court recognized that an antenuptial agreement is valid and
enforceable if it is entered into with full knowledge and without
fraud, duress, or coercion, if it is fair and reasonable in its terms,
and if an unforeseen condition of penury is not created as a result
of a party's lack of property or employability. 14 ' The court found,
however, that the total waiver of Marcia's rights to maintenance
and reasonable in light of her relaand attorney's fees was not fair
42
tive financial circumstances.
Essentially, the court recognized that Marcia Warren's financial
135. Id. at 230, 523 N.E.2d at 682.
136. Id. at 232, 523 N.E.2d at 682-83.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 230, 523 N.E.2d at 683.
App. 3d
141. Id. at 233, 523 N.E.2d at 683 (citing In re Marriage of Burgess, 138 Ill.
13, 485 N.E.2d 504 (3d Dist. 1985); Eule v. Eule, 24 I1. App. 3d 83, 320 N.E.2d 506 (1st
Dist. 1974); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1st Dist. 1972)).
142. Id. at 235, 523 N.E.2d at 684. The facts in Warren were distinguishable from
those in In re Marriage of Burgess because Mrs. Burgess had assets worth $412,000 and
annual investment income in excess of $38,000. Burgess, 138 Il.App. 3d at 15, 485
N.E.2d at 505. Consequently, the waiver of maintenance and property in Burgess was
fair and reasonable in light of Mrs. Burgess' circumstances, but could not be held so in
Mrs. Warren's case.
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expectations had risen with her marriage. The Warren decision
demonstrates that there are limitations upon a person's freedom to
contract in the context of antenuptial agreements. Obligations
must be discharged fairly and reasonably to have an agreement
which waives or limits maintenance enforced.
V.

MISCELLANEOUS CASES

14 3

In Bush v. Squellati,144 the Illinois Supreme Court reiterated the
policies of strictly construing statutes that are in derogation of the
common law and of limiting the court's involvement in family relationships. When addressing the issue of grandparental visitation,
the court held that it could not order visitation privileges for biological grandparents where the parents consented to the child's
adoption prior to the dissolution of their marriage. 145
In 1984, the child of a failing marriage was adopted by his greataunt and great-uncle. 146 Subsequently, the parents were divorced.
The maternal grandparents requested visitation rights in 1985.147
The grandparents argued that section 607(b) of the IMDMA permitted visitation rights to grandparents in adoption situations. 14
The court did not accept the grandparents' argument, noting
that section 607(b) provides for grandparental visitation when one
143. The cases that follow are included in this Survey either because they reiterate
familiar. Illinois judicial policy or because the issues in the cases have become moot
because of changes in legislation. They are included in the interest of completeness.
144. 122 Ill. 2d 153, 522 N.E.2d 1225 (1988).
145. Id. at 162, 522 N.E.2d at 1229.
146. Id. at 155, 522 N.E.2d at 1226.
147. Id.
148. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607(b) (1987), which provides:
(b) The court may grant reasonable visitation privileges to a grandparent or
great-grandparent of any minor child upon the grandparent's or great-grandparent's petition to the court, with notice to the parties required to be notified
under Section 601 of this Act, if the court determines that it is in the best interests and welfare of the child and may issue any necessary orders to enforce such
visitation privileges. Further, the court, pursuant to this subsection, may grant
reasonable visitation privileges to a grandparent or great-grandparent whose
child has died where the court determines that it is in the best interests and
welfare of the child; moreover, the adoption of the minor child by the spouse of
the child's surviving parent shall not preclude consideration by the court as to
whether granting visitation privileges to such grandparents or great-grandparents is in the best interests and welfare of the child. Further, adoption of the
minor by the spouse of a legal parent after termination of the parental rights of
the other parent does not preclude granting visitation privileges to a grandparent or great-grandparent under this subparagraph (b); hpwever, the court may
impose restrictions upon such visitation privileges in order to prevent contact
between the minor and the parent whose parental rights have been terminated.
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or both of the parents have been lost or in the case of a dissolution
proceeding.' 49 The court pointed out that in the case at bar, however, the adoption of the child took place prior to the parent's divorce. 150 Because section 607(b) was silent on this situation, and
because it was a statute in derogation of the common law, the court
declined to apply it. 51 Therefore, the grandparents were denied
standing to request visitation rights. 52 The decision in Bush v.
Squellati continues the Illinois courts' insistence upon narrow and
strict construction of grandparental visitation rights under section
607(b), thereby reiterating the principle that courts should limit
their involvement in personal family relationships.
In Nelson v. Hix,'53 the supreme court addressed the issue of
choice of forum in an interspousal tort action. Marjorie and Frank
Nelson, who were domiciliaries of Canada, were involved in an automobile collision in Illinois.' 54 When Marjorie Nelson filed suit
against the driver of the other car in Illinois, she included a negligence count against her husband. 5 '
Mrs. Nelson argued that the law of the married couple's domicile applies in tort actions. 156 Mr. Nelson responded that the tort
occurred in Illinois and that Illinois law provided for interspousal
immunity in tort actions occurring within the state. 157 Therefore,
he argued that the interspousal tort immunity barred the suit
against him. 5
The court held that the law of a couple's domicile governs the
right to maintain a tort action and not the law of the place where
149. Bush, 122 Ill. 2d at 157, 522 N.E.2d at 1226-27.
150. Id. at 161, 522 N.E.2d at 1229.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 122 Ill. 2d 343, 522 N.E.2d 1214 (1988).
154. Id. at 344, 522 N.E.2d at 1214.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 346, 522 N.E.2d at 1215.
157. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1001 (1987). Since Nelson went to trial,
however, section 1001 has been amended to allow interspousal tort suits, thereby making
the conflict in Nelson moot. The earlier language stated as follows: "A married woman
may, in all cases, sue and be sued without joining her husband with her, to the same
extent as if she were unmarried; provided, that neither husband nor wife may sue the
other for a tort to the person committed during coverture .. " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
para. 1001 (1985).
This section was amended, effective January 1, 1988, to state as follows: "A husband
or wife may sue the other for a tort committed during the marriage." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 40, para. 1001 (1987).
158. Nelson, 122 Ill. 2d at 344, 522 N.E.2d at 1215.
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the tort occurred.1 5 9 It pointed out that the domiciliary state's interest in preserving the marriage and regulating family relationships outweighed Illinois' interest in protecting the expectations of
insurance carriers. 16 Comity permits courts to disallow foreign
laws that are contrary to public policy, but a positive showing of
such contrariness is necessary. 16 ' There was no such showing in
Nelson.

1 62

The particular issues in Nelson have been rendered moot by the
change in section 1001. The Nelson decision, however, places Illinois clearly in line with the majority of decisions being developed
in the area of conflict-of-laws.
A final case that has been rendered moot by a change in an Illinois statute is In re Marriage of Landfield.163 In that case, the
supreme court held that the propriety of awarding prospective at1
torney's fees is moot after the attorney's services are rendered.'
The court acknowledged that an issue becomes moot when its out159. Id. at 353, 522 N.E.2d at 1219. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971), which states:

(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has
the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
principles stated in Section 6.
Id.

The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS provides several factors for

the court to consider when confronted with choice-of-law problems. For example, section 6 lists the following factors:
(2)(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests
of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
160. Nelson, 122 Ill. 2d at 351, 522 N.E.2d at 1218. The court stated that the Illinois
insurance policy purchased by the Nelsons did not provide that claims were to be decided
under Illinois law. In fact, carriers are on notice by the mobile nature of the automobile
that the vehicle may be driven to jurisdictions that prohibit interspousal tort suits. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 118 Ill. 2d 229, 514 N.E.2d 1005 (1987).
164. Id. at 232, 514 N.E.2d at 1006. Section 508 of the Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act was amended, effective January 1, 1988, to make the issue in this case
moot. That section states:
(a) The court from time to time, after due notice and hearing, and after considering the financial resources of the parties, may order either spouse to pay a
reasonable amount for his own costs and attorney's fees and for the costs and
attorney's fees necessarily incurred or, for the purpose of enabling a party lack-
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come cannot substantively affect either party.'61 5
Although this case was filed in 1978, the parties did not receive a
binding hearing until 1987.166 At that time, the judge ordered respondent to pay petitioner's prospective attorney's fees. 167 By the
time the appeal from this order reached the supreme court, the
services for which the prospective fees were awarded had been performed. 168 The issue, therefore, was moot and the merits of the
70
case were not addressed. 69 Thus, the appeal was dismissed.
VI.

CONCLUSION

During the Survey year, Illinois courts contributed to the steady
development of the law as it relates to the family by taking a new
look at basic questions involving rights and responsibilities between parents and children in the areas of support, termination of
parental rights, removal of a child to other states, and a child's
standing to enforce payment of his college education expenses. Illinois also fell into line with the majority of states by recognizing
that the law of a couple's domicile should apply in determining
whether a tort suit may be maintained between the parties, and by
abolishing interspousal tort immunity by statute. This steady
growth by re-examining the law will, hopefully, continue into the
next decade.

ing sufficient financial resources to obtain or retain legal representation, expected to be incurred by the other spouse ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 508(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
165. Landfield, 118 Ill. 2d at 233, 514 N.E.2d at 1006.
166. Id. at 231, 514 N.E.2d at 1005.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 232, 514 N.E.2d at 1006.
169. Id. at 233, 514 N.E.2d at 1006.
170. Id.

